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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, psychological research has shown a growing interest in the study of human social
interaction. This has led researchers to develop new paradigms and to formulate new theories
about how people adjust minds and bodies when interacting with each other (Schilbach et al.,
2013; Gallotti et al., 2017). One intriguing question that arises when dealing with social interactions
concerns what information actors share about each other when involved in a joint action. One of the
most influential theories in this field states that, given the fundamental social nature of joint actions,
people have the tendency to represent and map both one’s own and others’ task demands (Sebanz
et al., 2003, 2005). However, this view has recently been challenged by proponents of the “referential
coding account” who have criticized the apparent nonsocial nature of the tasks and methodologies
used to formulate and support the co-representation theory (Dolk et al., 2011, 2014).
In the present opinion article, we briefly describe the experimental paradigms often employed to
study the co-representation theory (section Co-representation theory: proponents and opponents).
Then, we illustrate potential methodological issues related to these paradigms (section A
methodological problem), and finally we propose a new strategy, based on the characterization of
movement kinematics, to address the open question about what is shared in shared actions (section
A motor solution).
CO-REPRESENTATION THEORY: PROPONENTS AND
OPPONENTS
Investigating joint performance requires researchers to focus on interactive experimental settings,
trying to overcome the long-lasting trend of studying humans in lonely environments (De Jaegher
et al., 2010; Schilbach et al., 2013). To this end, Sebanz et al. (Sebanz et al., 2003) proposed a social
version of a well-known individual Stimulus-Response Compatibility (SRC) paradigm: the Simon
Task.
In the joint version of the task, two stimulus-response mappings of a two-choice task are
distributed between two agents (e.g., Agent 1 presses for green squares; Agent 2 presses for red
squares). Even with no need of taking the other’s mapping into account, the results highlight an
interference effect between a task-irrelevant aspect of the stimulus (e.g., its position on the screen)
and a task-relevant aspect of the response (e.g., the position of the button to press). The similarity
with the original Simon effect led researchers to formulate the co-representation theory, which states
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that, given the social nature of joint actions, people tend to
co-represent automatically each other’s portion of the task in
a functionally equivalent way (Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005). This
theory has received support from many other studies that have
used SRC tasks to test its assumptions (e.g., Atmaca et al., 2008,
2011; Elekes et al., 2016).
The co-representation theory has nevertheless received
criticism. Some authors have argued that the behavior people
display during the joint Simon task derives from a universal
information-processing rule, having little to do with social skills
(Dolk et al., 2011, 2014). Different studies have demonstrated
that a nonsocial attention-attracting event, such as a Japanese
waving cat, elicits the very same behavior observed in the joint
Simon task (Dolk et al., 2013; Puffe et al., 2017). The main idea,
expressed by opponents of the co-representation theory in what
they call the referential coding account, is that the other person’s
action simply provides a spatial reference for one’s own action, in
the same way as any sufficiently salient event would do.
These two perspectives seem to be hardly reconcilable, lying
on contrasting interpretations. The debate thus appears to have
reached a stalemate, and the co-representation theory is facing
an unexpected impasse.
A METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEM
It is worth noticing that the referential coding account does
not intend to deny the social nature of joint performances:
what the authors claim as nonsocial is the behavior that arises
from joint SRC tasks used to investigate the co-representation
theory (e.g., Dolk et al., 2011, 2014; Yamaguchi et al., 2018). The
referential coding account is in fact a nonsocial way to explain the
observed effects, which thus sometimes fall in an interpretational
ambiguity.
This consideration raises a methodological problem. Two
possible issues may in fact concern the use of SRC tasks in
investigating co-representations: one is interpretational, one is
practical. Both issues stem from the task that the two participants
perform, which is for both a key press. This type of response
is described as discrete, and is often contrasted with continuous
responses (e.g., Song and Nakayama, 2009).
The interpretational issue relates to the poorness of the actions
performed. Investigating joint performance with a task that
involves discrete responses seems to reduce the social nature
of the interaction. Using such a simple task is surely helpful in
controlling the experimental setting, yet it pays the cost of dealing
with an unnatural social setting. In daily environments, our social
partners engage in actions that are much more complex, which
we understand and predict (for a review see Springer et al., 2012;
Hasson and Frith, 2016). Therefore, joint SRC tasks restrict the
focus to a partner’s action that may be too minimal to highlight a
social effect.
The practical issue concerns the dependent measure obtained
from joint SRC tasks: response time (RT). Although RTmeasures
have helped to infer several aspects of human cognitive processes,
it is well established that they restrict the investigation to a
unidimensional assessment of behavior, without the opportunity
of accessing the “continuity of the mind” (e.g., Spivey and
Dale, 2004; Song and Nakayama, 2009). In joint SRC tasks, RTs
show an interference effect, which suggest that we represent the
other person’s task and that this representation weakens our
performance. However, RTs do not allow to access the content
of this representation, limiting in a way the investigation of the
phenomenon. For example, to coordinate with others, we must
consider not onlywhatmovements others are doing, but also how
they are moving (Keller et al., 2014; Gallotti et al., 2017). RTs can
thus provide insightful information about the what component
of co-representations, but they cannot be informative about the
how–i.e., whether we also represent the specific movement styles
of others’ actions (but see Schmitz et al., 2017).
A MOTOR SOLUTION
To overcome the methodological issues that seem to affect
joint SRC paradigms, here we propose a different experimental
strategy that might shed light on the co-representation
phenomenon.
We propose to turn to experimental paradigms that elicit a
more complex and enriched overt motor activity. These joint
motor tasks could help to address both the interpretational and
the practical issues linked to joint SRC tasks.
On the interpretational level, dealing with a partner that
makes complex movements can enhance the ecological validity
of the experiments, bringing the setting closer to a real-life social
interaction. Human movements present unique features that
distinguish them from artificial-generated motions (Thompson
and Parasuraman, 2012; Steel et al., 2014); furthermore, besides
fundamental regularities (Viviani and Flash, 1995), individuals
show specific movement styles (Ting et al., 2015; Koul et al.,
2016). The exclusively human capability to understand, predict,
anticipate, and adjust to how other people move establishes the
profound social aspect of joint performances. We thus believe
that, assuming the validity of the co-representation theory, the
use of motor tasks could help to reject alternative nonsocial
interpretations of joint SRC results.
On the practical level, movement kinematics might constitute
a muchmore informative dependent measure than RTs, although
caution must be taken when dealing with multivariate measures
that provide huge amounts of data (e.g., high levels of false
positives; Simmons et al., 2011). When investigating internal
processes, some authors suggest to replace RT measures with
dependent variables that are more fluid, continuous, and that can
change over time (Freeman et al., 2011); movement kinematics
could be a good candidate because of their capacity of reflecting
the unfolding of internal dynamic processes over time (Song and
Nakayama, 2009; Freeman et al., 2011). Indeed, despite the role
played by inhibitory processes (for a review see Schall et al.,
2017), human movements reveal a lot about both our external
and our internal world. For example, movement kinematics
have proven to be different depending on objects’ size, shape,
mass, and even texture and fragility (Weir et al., 1991; Castiello
et al., 1992; Savelsbergh et al., 1996; Ansuini et al., 2015; for
review see Jeannerod et al., 1995; Castiello, 2005). Even more
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interestingly, kinematic features encode information about more
abstract internal states, including intentions (Cavallo et al., 2016;
Becchio et al., 2018), decisions (McKinstry et al., 2008), numerical
representations (Song and Nakayama, 2008), and other cognitive
processes (Song and Nakayama, 2009; Freeman et al., 2011).
Therefore, movement kinematics could be an adequate measure
to investigate complex internal representations, like those of
other persons’ tasks and actions.
The characterization of human movement has already been
extensively investigated in social interaction studies (Krishnan-
Barman et al., 2017); however, these studies often focus on
distinguishing between individual and social behavior, without
fully addressing the question of whether and how we use
information about the others to succeed in a joint action. A vast
literature suggests that our movements are different in a social
setting (Becchio et al., 2010; Krishnan-Barman et al., 2017), and
that they are highly influenced by other people’s movements
(Blakemore and Frith, 2005; Heyes, 2011). This seems to
indicate that other people’s actions are actually represented in
our brains when we act together; yet it remains unclear how
specific these representations are, and how they come into play
during joint performances: How and to what extent is the
representation of others’ task demands integrated within one’s
own motor system during joint actions? Does this representation
include information about the others’ motor behavior? Is
this information specific to the confederate one is interacting
with?
To address these questions, we propose to use joint motor
tasks involving participants in sequential actions, with the aim
of reaching a common goal. A possible method could be to
maintain the movement requirements of the first agent (A1)
constant throughout the interaction, while manipulating those
of the second agent (A2)–i.e., modifying the difficulty of A2’s
task, while keeping that of A1 constant. The kinematic profile
of the first agent’s movements could then be a good predictor
of the movement that the second agent is about to make
(Figure 1).
Compared to simultaneous actions, sequential motor tasks
might increase the internal validity of the studies that aim to
investigate co-representations, as they prevent from potential
confounds caused by automatic imitation and motor contagion
effects (Kilner et al., 2003; Heyes, 2011). Examining the similarity
between the movement profiles of the two agents might in fact
help on understanding how specific the representation of the
other person’s actions is, letting us begin accessing the content
of co-representations.
Consider the kinematic modulation that occurs when an
action is directed toward a small target: compared to large targets,
movements toward small targets require greater precision, which
is achieved through an earlier reach of the peak velocity and
a longer deceleration phase (e.g., Marteniuk et al., 1987). We
would in fact expect A2 to present an earlier time to peak velocity
and a longer deceleration phase when his movement is directed
toward a small, compared to a large target. If A1’s velocity
profile shows a modulation similar to that of A2, we would
be facing two possible explanations. The first would suggest
that A1 has formed a generic representation of A2’s task: A2’s
FIGURE 1 | In the joint motor task pairs of participants are asked to perform
sequential actions to reach a common goal. Agent 1 (A1) is asked to move an
object from the starting position to an intermediate target area. Then, A2
grasps the object in the intermediate target area and places it in a final target
area that varies across trials (e.g., different distance and size; upper panels).
We expect that A2’s task demands will be processed by A1. If so, kinematic
profiles of A1 movements should encode information about the movement
that A2 is about to make (lower panel).
targets might act as distractors for A1, producing an interference
effect. The second would suggest that A1 has formed a detailed
representation of A2’s action, including kinematic information
about the specific way in which A2 is going to move. In both
cases, we would expect a positive correlation between the velocity
profiles of the two agents. However, in the second case, the
observed correlation would be higher than any other correlation
obtained by permuting agents between pairs (e.g., correlation
between A1 movements of pair n and A2 movements of
pairm).
Another interesting aspect to explore would concern how the
first agent’s actions change over the course of the interaction.
Building a representation of a person’s actions may be a process
that needs time and practice. The quantification of this kinematic
adaptation could help to investigate how we learn to adjust
to others in a joint task, and this would lead to explore the
applicability of other theoretical models, such as associative
learning (Catmur et al., 2009) and predictive coding (Kilner et al.,
2007), to the joint action domain.
Furthermore, sequential motor tasks could provide a good
tool to investigate whether co-representations arise exclusively in
the joint action domain, where a common goal has to be achieved.
Recent literature suggests that common goals might not be
fundamental for creating social interactions (Gallotti et al., 2017).
At the same time, other evidence points to consider common
goals at the heart of reciprocal motor influence (della Gatta
et al., 2017). In order to disentangle these different perspectives,
it could be useful to investigate, through the manipulation of
the instructions, whether and how others’ motor representations
change as a function of the presence/absence of a common
goal.
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CONCLUSION
With the present opinion paper, we aimed at describing and
facing the methodological issues connected to the paradigms
currently used to support the co-representation theory. We
presented an alternative approach to investigate the co-
representation of actions, focused on the use of joint motor
tasks.
We believe that shifting the attention to movement
kinematics, and specifically to those emerging during sequential
joint actions, could further the current understanding of how
people successfully engage in joint performances. On the one
hand, it is reasonable to think that the co-representation theory
may gain from a motor approach the possibility of discarding the
current criticism. On the other hand, a motor approach might
provide the opportunity of bringing the investigation forward.
Movement kinematics could in fact be a good tool to investigate
not only how we form representations about others, but also
how we use co-representations to coordinate and adjust to
others.
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